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ABSTRACT.

By mid-March 2020, Israel had experienced the first wave of the COVID-19
pandemic. Within a fortnight, confirmed coronavirus cases surged from half a dozen to 178 cases.
In response to the challenge of identifying potential carriers, the government tasked the Israeli
Security Agency (the ISA, or Shin Bet) with tracing the routes of confirmed coronavirus patients
via cellphone location tracking and identifying individuals with whom the patients had been in
close contact.
Israel's ISA communications metadata collection measures have been shrouded in veil of
secrecy. The debate – in parliament and in court – regarding the use of the country's secret service
counterterrorism mass surveillance measures to contain the spread of the pandemic is a rare
opportunity to assess whether the institutional oversight mechanisms on SIGINT collection
activities are sufficient and effective.
The paper will (1) describe the existing SIGINT oversight regime in Israel; (2) describe the
SIGINT oversight ecosystem’s response to COVID-19 location tracking in Israel; and, (3) in light
of existing literature, provide an analysis of that response.
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ISRAEL’S SIGINT OVERSIGHT ECOSYSTEM

I. INTRODUCTION
"The [Internal Affairs] committee states that there were some past incidents that
could have been viewed as deviating from a direct security interest; The committee
expresses its will that principle under which these services operate only in matters
directly pertaining to the security of Israel shall be strictly followed."

These two laconic lines by the Israeli’s Knesset ad hoc parliamentary
subcommittee for the matter of secret wiretapping devices and secret party services
concluded the parliamentary response to the two Shin Bet operatives discovered in
January 1953 while installing listening devices in the headquarters of the United
Workers Party (Mapam). In the early years of the Israeli state, the mere existence of
the Shin Bet, the domestic security service later to be known as the Shabak, the
General Security Service (GSS) or the Israel Security Agency (ISA), was kept secret
and was employed by the dominant ruling party, the Workers of Eretz-Israel Party
(Mapai) against political opponents.2
In the following decades, public, parliamentary, and judicial attention to
intelligence oversight in Israel tended to focus on HUMINT (Human Intelligence)
investigatory powers.  More than half a century later, the COVID-19 pandemic
reawakened the public discourse regarding the regulation and oversight of
government surveillance practices.  The policy undertaken by the Israeli
government in the wake of the first wave of the coronavirus – employing

1

DK (1956) 357, 370 (Isr.).

2

Ian Black & Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars 149–153 (1991) However, it should be
noted that some of the Shin Bet counterespionage activities targeting Mapam were justified.
According to the KGB archive, some Mapam MKs did in fact share classified information with the
Soviet Union. See Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our
Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World, (2005).

3

See for example the overview by Bitton, which highlights HUMINT cases such as the torture
ruling by the high court of justice. Raphael Bitton, In Law We Trust: The Israeli Case of Overseeing
Intelligence, in Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the 21st Century
141 (Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2016) [hereinafter Global Intelligence
Oversight].

4

It should be noted, however, that there was privacy-centered public discourse in Israel
during the first two decades of the 21st century. The still ongoing campaign against the
government biometric database and the campaign against the “Big Brother Law” (the
Communications Data Law, see infra note 20), the latter culminating in HCJ 3809/08 Association
for Civil Rights in Israel v. Israeli Police (2012) (Isr.) (unpublished), non-official English
translation available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/association-civil-rights-israel-visrael-police [https://perma.cc/PX9X-F85N][hereinafter ACRI]. For the campaign against the
biometric database, see Michelle Spektor, Imagining the Biometric Future: Debates Over National
Biometric Identification in Israel, 29 Science as Culture 100–126 (2020).
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surveillance measures which were reserved for counterterrorism purposes to
contain the spread of the virus – was not adopted by any other western democracy.
Whereas routine ISA practices are shrouded in secrecy for operational reasons, the
unique biopolitical nature of Covid-19 surveillance, coupled with the political
stalemate within which Israel met the first wave of the pandemic, fostered a publicly
open response by oversight actors and an open debate of the ISA’s online
surveillance measures.
This paper will first briefly introduce the SIGINT oversight ecosystem in Israel
during routine, non-COVID-related times and its applicable legal framework. Then
it shall provide an outline of the response of the various actors of the Israeli SIGINT
oversight ecosystem to the ISA’s coronavirus surveillance, and will evaluate its main
product, the Authorization Law. Then it shall proceed to analyze the performance
of the SIGINT oversight ecosystem in the COVID-19 epidemic, and assess what
lessons can be learned regarding its performance in routine, COVID-free times.
II. SIGINT AND METADATA ACQUISITION IN ISREAL

The use of Signals Intelligence measures by Israeli intelligence services can be
traced back to the era predating the formation of the country, as Jewish resistance
movements operated comprehensive wiretapping operations, listening in on
British officials and Arab leaders. However, Signals Intelligence, or SIGINT, is not
just wiretapping: it is, rather, a plethora of intelligence disciplines deriving
information from electronic devices. This paper shall use the terms “SIGINT” and
“online surveillance” interchangeably, to refer to intelligence measures involving
the interception, collection, and analysis of data originating from electronic

5

Joseph A. Cannataci (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy), Report, 78, U.N. Doc.
A/75/147 (July 27, 2020).

6

For a comparative review of contact tracing measures, see Tehila Shwartz Altshuler & Rachel
Aridor Hershkowitz, Digital Contact Tracing and the Coronavirus: Israeli and
Comparative Perspectives (Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2020).

7

The Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the
Spread of the Novel Coronavirus and to Promote Use of Civilian Technology to Locate
Individuals who were in Close Contact with Patients (Temporary Provisions) 57802020,
SH
2816,
166
(Isr.),
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/502_316.htm
[https://perma.cc/6RJJ-DU46] [hereinafter Authorization Law].
8

Stacy Perman, Spies, Inc.: Business innovation from Israel’s masters of espionage
33 (2005).
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communications.
This paper focuses on SIGINT practices by two internal government agencies:
the ISA, Israel’s domestic security service, whose missions are primarily
counterterrorism and counterintelligence,  and the police – Israel’s leading law
enforcement agency. There are other intelligence agencies in Israel’s intelligence
community that are tasked with the collection of international SIGINT, such as the
Mossad and Israel Defense Force’s SIGINT Unit 8200. However, the SIGINT
practices of both agencies are not directly regulated under any specific law.
Government-sanctioned online surveillance laws tend to differentiate between
the rules pertaining to the interception, collection, processing and retention of
content data and those applicable to metadata (data about the communications).
The rules applying to the interception, collection, processing and retention of
metadata traditionally tend to be more lax than those applying to content data and
allow government agencies much more leeway, based on a tacit assumption that
metadata is less revealing than content data. The same applies to Israeli online
surveillance laws.
However, as technology progresses, traditional legal categories may no longer
apply. The Dutch online surveillance law, prior to its recent reform, differentiated
between cable-bound communications and non-cable-bound communications (i.e.,
electromagnetic transmissions via antennae).12It may be the case that in an era
predating cellular phones, where most non-cable-bound communications were for
military purposes, this distinction merited different rules. Nowadays, it is obsolete.
Similarly, technological developments gradually erode the underlying assumptions
supporting the different rules for content data and metadata, which are becoming
as obsolete as the distinction between the contents of a letter and the address details
of its recipient.
9

Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Technical Collection of Intelligence, in Handbook of Intelligence
Studies 105, 108–111 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2006); Julian Richards, Signals Intelligence, in
Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies 84, 85–93 (Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman
And Claudia Hillebrand eds., 2014).
10
§ 7, General Security Service Law, 5972-2002, SH 1832, 172 (Isr.). [hereinafter ISA Law], nonofficial English translation available at https://knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns15_GSS_
eng.pdf.
11

Omer Tene, Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in Israel: Balancing Security Needs
with Democratic Accountability in Bulk Collection: Systematic Government Access to
Private-Sector Data 91, 106 (Fred H. Cate and James Dempsey eds., 2017).

12

Quirine Eijkman, Nico Van Eijk & Robert Van Schaik, Dutch National Security Reform
Under Review: Sufficient Checks and Balances in the Intelligence and Security
Services Act 2017 21–22 (2018). 
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Indeed, “metadata,” which no longer signifies the few data points on the back
of an envelope, but rather a voluminous amount of information, has become more
valuable to intelligence services than ever.  This can be attributed to the
convenience of its analysis (content data requires either human analyst or
sophisticated AI techniques to process in mass volumes, where automated
processing of metadata is much easier) as well as to the prevalence of connected
mobile devices, either cellular phones, smartphones or other Internet of Things
(IoT) devices, which produce a constant electronic trail of their users’ activities that
may be less ‘escapable’ than contents data.
Another distinction found in SIGINT law worldwide is one of purpose. The
rules applying to online surveillance for national security purposes tend to be more
lax than those applying to law enforcement purposes. An underlying reason is that
the different balance of interests involved in national security justifies looser rules
for governments engaged in SIGINT practices that infringe upon individuals’
privacy rights. Israel is no different.
The interception of the contents of electronic communications for law
enforcement purposes (by Israeli police and other law enforcement agencies) and

13

See ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).

14

See for example Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and
Security: A Modern and Transparent Legal Framework (2015); European Commission for
Democracy Through Law, Report on The Democratic Oversight Of Signals
Intelligence Agencies, ¶48 (2015) [hereinafter Signals Intelligence Report];
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Review of the
Mandatory Data Retention Regime, ¶ 71 (2019). On privacy threats posed by location data and
contact data in the context of COVID19 contact tracing, see Privacy Protection Authority, PPA
Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National
Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020)
[hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 1], available in Hebrew only at https://www.gov.il/
BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus/he/privacy-shabak-coronavirus.pdf
15

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).

16

See Asaf Lubin, “We Only Spy on Foreigners”: The Myth of a Universal Right to Privacy and the
Practice of Foreign Mass Surveillance, 18 Chi. J. Int'l 502 (2018). For U.S. cases, see for example United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
Recently, the German Constitutional Court ruled that the BND must still respect the fundamental
right to privacy of individuals when engaging in mass surveillance of foreign intelligence. See
Russell A. Miller, The German Constitutional Court Nixes Foreign Surveillance, Lawfare, May 27, 2020,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/german-constitutional-court-nixes-foreign-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/AF7Z-JKQR].
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for national security purposes (by the ISA) is governed by the Wiretap Law, which
contains different provisions for each purpose. While police wiretapping is subject
to a judicial warrant by a senior district judge and is limited to felony offences, ISA
wiretapping is not reviewed ex ante by the court, but by the Prime Minister.
Acquisition of communications metadata by law enforcement agencies is
regulated under the Communications Data Law, and by the ISA under the ISA
Law. Pursuant to the Communications Data Law, law enforcement agencies may
apply for a judicial warrant ordering licensed telecommunications providers to
provide communications metadata $%&)-%$!2:.#!3).-!3!4"2#1)"%1!3!!-$
1!&&)#!3!/1%#+4$)-'3(%#.-3%-32.&%+%#31.-)##.,,4-)#!3).-2;, for purposes
of protection of human life, investigation, detection or prevention of offences or
offenders (of misdemeanors or felonies),  or lawful forfeiture. The police can
request a warrant for acquisition of future metadata limited to no more than 30

17

Wiretap Law, 5739-1979, SH 938 p.188 (Isr.) [hereinafter Wiretap Law]. See also Omer Tene,
supra note 11.

18

§ 6, Wiretap Law, supra note 17. Israeli Law distinguishes between three types of offenses:
Felonies (offenses which bear a penalty more severe than three years of imprisonment),
Misdemeanors (offenses which bear a penalty more severe than three months and less than three
years of imprisonment) and Transgressions (offenses which bear a penalty of no more than three
months of imprisonment). See § 24, Penal Law, 5737–1977, LSI (Special Volume) (Isr.).
19

§ 4, Wiretap Law, supra note 17.

20

Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement powers – Communications Data), 5768-2007, SH 2122
72 (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_876.htm [https://perma.cc/2CXJ-XMY8]
[hereinafter Communications Data Law].

21

§ 11, ISA Law, supra note 10.

22

Section 1 of the Telecommunications Law 5742-1982, SH 1060 218 (Isr.) [hereinafter
Telecommunications Law], defines Telecommunication as the “transmission, transmission or
reception of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or information using wire, radio, optic
systems or any other electromagnetic system.” Accordingly, Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
Cellular services providers and providers of landline communication services all require a license
under the Telecommunications Law.

23

§ 1, Communication Data Law, supra note 20, further defines Location Data (location data of
a device held by a subscriber), Subscriber Data (type of telecommunication service provided to the
subscriber; the subscriber’s name, address and identification number; the subscriber's payment
method and details; the address at which the device used by the subscriber was installed; and data
identifying the subscriber's device) and Traffic Data (communication's type, time, volume and
length, as data identifying the source, target and any other intermediating devices used and data
identifying the other party thereto).
24

See §6, Wiretap Law, supra note 17.
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days following the date of issue of the warrant.  The constitutionality of the
Communication Data Law, and in particular its infringement upon the right to
privacy, was challenged in ACRI v. Police, where the High Court of Justice ruled
that the provisions of the Communications Data law are to be construed narrowly,
allowing for targeted collection of metadata only.
While metadata acquisition for law enforcement purposes is subject to ex ante
judicial review, limited to particular types of metadata, and subject to temporal
constraints, the rules governing the ISA’s acquisition, processing and retention of
metadata are different. Under Section 11 of the ISA Law, the Prime Minister is
empowered to set rules that define certain categories of data as categories that the
ISA requires to fulfill its statutory duties and that licensed telecommunication
service providers are obliged to transfer to the ISA.28 “Data” is broadly defined as
“excluding the content of a conversation as defined in the Wiretap Law 1979-5739.”
Accordingly, all types of metadata (rather than the exhaustive list in the
Communications Data Law) are capturable under the ISA Law. As with content
data, the ISA Law does not require any ex ante judicial review of the service’s
metadata SIGINT practices. The use of data obtained under the ISA Law is subject
only to the authorization of the ISA director. Such authorization may be given for
periods not exceeding six months and renewed indefinitely.29 The rules governing
the use, retention, security and processing of such data are set by the Prime
Minister,30 and like all rules set under the provisions of the ISA Law, remain secret.31
Certain provisions in the telecommunications law authorize the Prime Minister to
order license holders to install or configure devices, or otherwise assist security
authorities, including the ISA, to the extent it is required for the fulfilment of the
authorities under the law.32
Section 11 of the ISA Law was enacted in 2002. It was added to the draft bill in
between the first reading and the following readings of the law, and it didn’t receive
25

§ 3(g) Communications Data Law, supra note 20. Compare with the Australian provisions of
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) ss 175–176, 178–180B (Austl.).

26

See § 7, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752, SH 1391, 150 (Isr.). English translation
available at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm[https://perma.cc/C7E5
-BFHK].

27

ACRI, supra note 4. See also Tene, supra note 11 at 102–103.

28

§ 11(b), ISA Law, supra note 10.

29

§ 11(d), ISA Law, supra note 10.

30

§ 11(e), ISA Law, supra note 10.

31

§ 19(a), ISA Law, supra note 10.

32

§ 13(b), Telecommunications Law.
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much attention. The ISA director at the time, Avi Dicther, later said that “we tried
to pass it under the radar screen, because it was potentially a very problematic
section, even though that in 2002 not everybody fully understood the implications
of metadata.” Indeed, it was not until the early days of the first wave of COVID-19
outbreak that the Israeli public became aware of “the Tool.”
Within two weeks of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s televised statement
regarding the intended use of digital monitoring tools to track coronavirus
carriers, an exposé by Ronen Bergman and Ido Shvartztuch revealed the existence
of “the Tool.”  According to Bergman and Shvartztuch, during the nearly two
decades since authorized to do so in the ISA Law, the service has been building up a
voluminous database containing all the metadata transferred through Israeli
telecommunication services.
Unlike the contested American metadata bulk collection under the Section 215
program, the Tool collects more than mere call detail records (CDRs). Rather, the
Tool collects the widest possible definition of “Data” in the ISA Law, including
CDRs, location data,  web browsing history,  technical router data (where
available)  and possibly other categories of metadata from which valuable
information could be extracted. This richness of the data types it collects renders

33

Avi Dichter, speaking in College of Management, A Decade to the ISA Law, YouTube (Mar. 20,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BZ1sZqa0BR0 [https://perma.cc/D28Q-QZQR] (at
minute 19, in Hebrew, translated by author).

34

Judah Ari Gross, Netanyahu sparks privacy scare with move to track corona patients’ phones, The
Times of Israel (15.3.2020), available at https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-sparksprivacy-concerns-with-move-to-track-corona-patients-phones/ [https://perma.cc/W38U-SFZP].
35

Ronen Bergman and Ido Shvartztuch, The 'Tool', the ISA secret database has been collecting data
on all Israeli citizens and knows: where were you, whom you have spoken to, and when Yediot Aharonot
(25.3.2020) [Hebrew] available at https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5701611,00.html
[https://perma.cc/64JS-QQTK].

36

See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records
Program Conducted Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT and on the Operations
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (2014).
37

See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(k)(3) (2018).

38

As can be inferred from its use for contact tracing.

39

Bergman & Shvartztuch, supra note 35.

40

See for example Ran Bar Zick, Here's How to Protect Yourself Against Israel’s Cyber Snooping
Haaretz (Nov. 12, 2020) (Isr.), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/tech-news/.premium-heres-how-to-protect-yourself-against-israel-s-cyber-snooping-1.9303295 [https://perma.cc/6DBZL4VD].

459

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

19:2 (2021)

the Tool much more effective than its American parallel, whose utility is doubted.
According to Bergman and Shvartztuch’s account, the Tool has been successful in
countless counterterrorism operations. Naturally, other agencies have sought
access to the Tool over the years, which has rarely been granted.
The ISA’s immense database is allegedly safeguarded from misuse – however,
there is very scarce evidence to support that assertion other than the assurances
made by former ISA employees interviewed by Bergman and Shvartztuch. Despite
the astounding public revelation by Bergman and Shvartztuch, a thorough Israeli
public discussion of the Tool, echoing the ones held worldwide in the aftermath of
the -.6$%-1%5%+!3).-2$)$-.3&.++.6
III. THE ISRAELI SIGINT OVERSIGHT ECOSYSTEM

Oversight of intelligence and law enforcement agencies is an essential feature
of democratic regimes. Activities that infringe upon human rights are inherent to
41

See discussion at Susan Landau & Asaf Lubin, Examining the Anomalies, Explaining the Value:
Should the USA FREEDOM Act’s Metadata Program be Extended?, 11 Har. Nat’l Sec. J. 308 (2020).

42

Before Bergman and Shvartztuch’s revelation, the only public evidence of such an attempted
access to the Tool’s database was when the state comptroller requested the ISA to provide location
tracking and cellular traffic data of certain senior security officials involved in a scandal
investigated by the Comptroller’s office. The state comptroller report bitterly complains the ISA’s
refusal to comply. See State Comptroller Office, Report on the “Harpaz” Affair 24–25 (2012)
[Hebrew]. Bergman and Shvartztuch mention additional attempts to use the Tool for purposes
other than those authorized by law, see § 6, ISA Law, supra note 10, including propositions to use
the Tool to track illegal immigrants, or to monitor the communications of high-ranking officials
(including the director of the Mossad and the head of the Military Intelligence) to monitor for
potential leaks of plans to strike Iran), which were denied. Bergman & Shvartztuch, supra note 35.
43

See Amir Cahane, The (Missed) Israeli Snowden Moment Int’l J. Intelligence &
Counterintelligence (forthcoming, 2021).
44

On Intelligence oversight, see Hans Born, Towards Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence
Services: Lessons Learned from Comparing National Practices, 3(4) Connections: The Q. J. 1 (2004);
Hans Born & Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best
Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (2005) [hereinafter Born & Leigh]; Who's
Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Hans Born et al.
eds., 2005); Democratic Control of Intelligence Services – Containing Rogue Elements
(Hans Born & Marina Caparini eds., 2007); Aidan Wills, Guidebook: Understanding
Intelligence Oversight (2010); Amy Zegart, Eye on Spies: Congress and the United
States Intelligence Community (2011); International Intelligence Cooperation and
Accountability (Hans Born et al. eds., 2011); Overseeing Intelligence Services: A Toolkit
(Hans Born & Aidan Wills eds., 2012) [hereinafter Toolkit]; Claudia Hillebrand, Intelligence
Oversight and Accountability, in Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies 305 (Robert
Dover, Michael S. Goodman & Claudia Hillebrand eds., 2014); Genevieve Lester, When Should
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these agencies,  and therefore mechanisms should be in place that ensure such
infringements are limited by standards of proportionality and necessity. Proper
oversight and control over intelligence and law enforcement services contribute to
their accountability and to public trust, whereas ineffective oversight ecosystem
can serve as a veneer of legitimacy enabling unhindered misuse of power. 
Regardless of the legality of mass surveillance practices,  the potential reach of
modern SIGINT activities requires the special attention of policymakers to design
proper oversight mechanisms, ensuring minimal invasion of privacy and adherence
to standards of necessity and proportionality, as well as safeguards against
potential mission creep or private misuse of surveillance powers. As the ISA has
been siphoning bulk metadata into the Tool for nearly two decades, the importance
of its oversight mechanisms cannot be overstated.
The Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem is basically its intelligence oversight
array. At times it may focus on specific SIGINT matters. On the internal level, which
some view as a primary guarantee against abuses of power, we can only assume
that members of the Israeli IC deploy basic automated measures and
documentation to log and control internal access to restricted information. Former
senior ISA employees claim that such measures and internal procedures are in
place, and that the few occurrences of misuse of the Tool int its early days resulted
in severe sanctions, so the contemporary organizational culture treats the Tool with
State Secrets Stay Secret?: Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence
(2015); Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, 51 Stan. J.
Int'l. L. 69 (2015); Sarah Eskens, Ot van Daalen & Nico van Eijk, Ten Standards for
Oversight and Transparency of National Intelligence Services (2015); Loch K. Johnson,
Spy Watching: Intelligence Accountability in the United States (2018); Hugh Bochel,
Andrew Defty &d Jane Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers: Parliament and the
Intelligence Services (2014).
45

See Aidan Wills, Understanding Intelligence Oversight 31 (2007); European
Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Parliamentary Oversight of Security and
Intelligence Agencies in the European Union 85 (2011); European Commission for
Democracy Through Law, Report on The Democratic Oversight of the Security
Services 4 (2015)[hereinafter Security Services Report]; Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights, Democratic and Effective Oversight of National Security Services
23–27 (2015) [hereinafter COEHR].

46

Monica den Boer, Conducting Oversight, in Toolkit, supra note 44, at 69, 83.

 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branches from
Within, 115 Yale L. J. 2314, 2321 (2006).
47

48

The ECtHR grand chamber ruling in the Big Brother Watch case is still pending (for the ruling
of the first instance, see infra at 96).
49

Security Services Report, supra note 45, at 29.
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“the fear of God.”
In addition to internal control mechanisms, Israeli law enforcement and
security agencies have their own gatekeepers.  In the ISA, these are the legal
advisor and the internal comptroller. The internal comptroller enjoys a special
status, under a set of specific provisions in the ISA Law that strengthen the ISA
comptroller’s independence and jurisdiction further than comptrollers of other
public authorities.  Unlike the comptroller, the legal advisor is not defined by
statute; Pursuant to the aftermath of the 300 affair in the 1980s, the legal
department of the service has been reorganized and its legal advisor became a part
of the service’s higher management.
Executive oversight of SIGINT activities is performed on several levels.
Wiretaps for national security purposes are subject to a ministerial ex ante
authorization. Although properly deliberated ex ante authorizations may be timeconsuming, the larger share of oversight activity is ex post and is mainly handled
by the Attorney General’s office.
The Attorney General (AG) in Israel is the “authorized interpreter of the law vis
a vis the Executive.” This approach, different from the one prevailing in the U.S.,

50

Bergman & Shvartztuch, supra note 35.

51

Amir Cahane & Yuval Shany, Oversight of Online Surveillance in Israel 190–194
(2020) [Hebrew].

52

§ 13, ISA Law, supra note 10.

53

Eli Bachar, The Role of the Legal Counsel in Security Agencies 66 (2013) [Hebrew].

54

§ 4, Wiretap Law, supra note 17. It should be noted that any wiretapping or other SIGINT
practices of content acquisition whose targets are foreign are not subject to the provisions of the
Wiretap Law. See CivA 4211/91 State of Israel v. Al Masri et al., 47(5) PD 636; Amir Cahane & Yuval
Shany, Regulation of Online Surveillance in Israeli Law and Comparative Law 233–238
(2019) [Hebrew].

55
See for example, the comment of UK’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David
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where the AG is a “hired gun,” coupled with the Israeli AG’s statutory oversight
functions, allows the office of the AG to significantly influence the interpretation of
Israeli online surveillance law and practices. The Prime Minister provides a
quarterly report to the AG about wiretap authorizations.  Heads of security
services must promptly report to the AG any emergency authorization to wiretap
privileged communications which was given in lieu of judicial authorization, and
the AG may revoke them. Pursuant to the provisions of the ISA Law, the Director
of the ISAreports quarterly to the AG of authorizations to use the Tool. According
to former senior ISA employees, “the quarterly meetings with the AG are thorough,
we argue . . . it is a very excruciating experience for the ISA Director.” AG oversight
of police SIGINT activities is more detailed. The police commissioner reports
monthly to the AG regarding wiretap warrants.  The police commissioner must
also promptly report to the AG any emergency authorization to wiretap in lieu of a
judicial warrant, and the AG may revoke it. Any application for a judicial warrant
for wiretapping privileged communications is subject to the authorization of the
AG.
Parliamentary oversight of SIGINT in Israel is conducted through the Knesset’s
committees. General oversight of intelligence matters is under the purview of the
Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and is handled through its
Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee (hereinafter: the Intelligence
Subcommittee). The Intelligence Subcommittee is the statutory parliamentary
oversight body of the ISA. Pursuant to the ISA Law, the ISA director reports to the
Intelligence Subcommittee on matters pertaining to the service’s activities. 
Regulations and rules the prime minister is authorized to set under the ISA Law are
subject to the approval of the Intelligence Subcommittee.  Also, any executive
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resolution authorizing the ISA to perform activities in an area that is not among its
statutory core areas requires the Subcommittee’s approval.
The meetings of the Intelligence Subcommittee are confidential, unless it has
decided otherwise. Accordingly, little is known of the Subcommittee’s activities;
however it appears that its main concentration is on the operational efficacy of the
Israeli IC, as well as budget review, rather than on matters of legal compliance and
respect to human rights.  Many of the former members of the subcommittee
interviewed by %1',!-!-$(5!13934#(%7()")3%$:!/499+)-'+!#*.&*-.6+%$'%
!-$4-$%123!-$)-';.&3(%..+ 
The parliamentary oversight of police activities is under the Internal Security
Subcommittee, established in 2015. However, annual police wiretap reports and
annual police metadata acquisition reports (when applicable)  are made to the
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.
The Knesset may also elect ad hoc inquest committees in matters pertaining to
SIGINT. In 1950, following the Mapam wiretap scandal, such an ad hoc committee
was established.  A parliamentary investigatory committee was established also in
2006, to “examine the legal framework and balances between the right to privacy
and other public interests” and to “investigate the matter of wiretapping for crime
prevention and detections (and not for national security) purposes.” 
Ex ante judicial oversight of SIGINT is limited. While wiretaps and metadata
acquisition for law enforcement purposes are subject to a judicial warrant, ISA
wiretaps and metadata acquisition are not.  The inadmissibility of unlawful
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wiretaps incentivizes its ex post judicial review.  However SIGINT acquired for
national security purposes is rarely used in court, and if so it is presented ex parte.
Accordingly, the Israeli court cannot apply random oversight of ISA wiretaps nor of
ISA metadata collection through litigation. Nevertheless through constitutional
or administrative challenges, Israeli court can potentially have an important role as
an oversight body – at a policy level – of all governmental online surveillance
practices, as it did the in ACRI v. Police or the Ben Meir case.
-.3(%1 .5%12)'(3 !#3.1 )2 3(% 3!3% .,/31.++%1 - 3(% /!23 3(% 3!3%
Comptroller’s office has examined the use of police wiretapping. The Israeli IC is
also within its purview,  yet prior to the State Comptroller’s 2020 interim special
report on Israel’s response to the COVID-19 crisis,  which examined the use of the
ISA for contact tracing, no other review by the Comptroller of Israel’s IC’s SIGINT
practices has been made public to date. Under Israeli law, the State Comptroller is
highly independent and is free to select matter to review.  The law allows for parts
of the State Comptroller’s reports to remain secret for reasons of national security,
or in order to avoid an impairment of Israel’s foreign relations or its international
trade.  The recommendations made by the State Comptroller are not legally
binding. 
Although the Privacy Protection Authority (hereinafter: PPA and formerly
known as ILITA (Israel Law and Information Technology Authority)), serves as
Israel’s independent data protection authority, the extent of its oversight over
national security is undefined and limited. Prior to the coronavirus epidemic, no
76

§ 13 Wiretap Law, supra note 17.

77

Cf. Mark Rumold, Regulating Surveillance Through Litigation: Some Thoughts from the Trenches, in
The Cambridge Handbook of Surveillance Law 579, 580 (David Gray and Stephen E.
Henderson eds., 2017).
78

ACRI, supra note 4; Ben Meir Ruling, supra note 68.

79

See Cahane & Shany (2020), supra note 51, at 204–06.

80

Id. at n.894.

81

State Comptroller's Office, The State of Israel Response to the Covid-19 Crisis Special Interim Report (Oct. 2020) [Hebrew]. English version of the forward to the report is
available at https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Documents/2020/COVID-19/2020COVID-19-003-preface-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/B66U-JEHU].

82

§2 (b), Basic Law: The State Comptroller, 5748, SH No. 1237 p.30 (Isr.).

83

§ 17 (a), State Comptroller Law, 5718-1958 [Consolidated Version], SH 248 p. 92, (Isr.). English
translation available at https://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/Laws/Documents/Laws-Compotrollerlaw.pdf, [perma.cc/TWK9-LJWU] [hereinafter State Comptroller Law].
84

HCJ 9223/10 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime Minister ¶ 21 (2012) (Isr.)
(unpublished).

465

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

19:2 (2021)

statutory provision has given the PPA explicit oversight authority over security
services, and the exceptions granted thereto in the provisions of Israel’s privacy
protection law  renders the PPA’s theoretical SIGINT oversight mandate virtually
moot.
Although not officially part of the SIGINT oversight ecosystem, civil society
bodies and academia play a role, in Israel and everywhere else,  in keeping SIGINT
practices in check. NGOs and academics alike provide the public with information
regarding state SIGINT practices, and through litigation aim to shape its policies
and legal framework. Civil society bodies were significant actors in the oversight
ecosystem during the coronavirus outbreak.
Eskens et al. offered a set of standards that will be used here to assess the
Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem. First, before outlining them, another standard
should be mentioned: a detailed legislative framework for SIGINT is a condition for
effective oversight. Basic democratic precepts mandate such a framework. In
addition to the precondition of a legal framework regulating state practices of
online surveillance, there are other standards according to which an oversight
ecosystem could be assessed:
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• Complete oversight – an effective oversight ecosystem must be
institutionally, temporally, procedurally and substantively complete.
Institutionally, the oversight ecosystem should be composed of
internal and external actors, of which one should be a designated
independent oversight body.  Internal and executive controls are
insufficient.  Temporally, an oversight ecosystem should encompass
ex ante, ex post and ongoing review.  Procedurally, oversight should
attend to all aspects of the intelligence cycle: collection, retention,
selection and examination and analysis. The substantive completeness
of an oversight ecosystem requires attention to matters of legal
compliance and operational efficacy, as well as human rights
adherence and budgetary controls. The literature does not always
mention all these as oversight purposes, and indeed oversight bodies
tend to focus on two purposes or even a single one. 
• Independence – at least one oversight actor should be independent. 
Independence – both institutional and political – influences the
efficacy of many oversight bodies.  EU jurisprudence tends to rely on
the judicial branch as an ex ante independent SIGINT oversight body. 
In lieu of judicial oversight, the jurisprudence of the European Court
Of Human Rights requires an independent oversight actor.
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• Ex ante oversight – Eskens et al. recommend that the SIGINT oversight
ecosystem should be temporally complete, and they stress the
importance of ex ante oversight.
• Power to declare a measure unlawful and to provide for redress – effective
SIGINT oversight requires that some of the oversight actors have the
power to declare surveillance measures unlawful, or to refrain from
authorizing the security and intelligence services to use it ex ante, as
well as providing individual redress. 
• Adversarial principle – as ex ante proceedings are often ex parte, any
judicial or quasi-judicial oversight body authorizing ex ante online
surveillance measures should incorporate adversarial positions. 
Special advocates or amicus curiae may serve as such adversarial
function.
• Expertise – SIGINT oversight is a complex task that requires
interdisciplinary knowledge and skills in national security,
intelligence, legal and technological matters. Accordingly, the efficacy
of an oversight ecosystem depends on the expertise of its personnel.
Without proper expertise, oversight actors that may even enjoy
unrestricted access to data cannot critically examine it. Furthermore,
expertise allows for stronger independence, as it reduces capture and
deference.
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• Sufficient Resources – budgets of intelligence services, and in particular
those who develop and operate online surveillance measures, tend to
be exorbitant,  while their oversight bodies are usually underbudgeted.  Proper allocation of funds, which reflects the extent of
their mandate, allows for effective oversight and fortifies both the
expertise and the independence of oversight bodies.
• Transparency – establishing public trust in the oversight ecosystem
(and subject to its findings, in the IC) requires a degree of
transparency.  Due to national security considerations, full
disclosure of a finding is rarely possible, especially in operational
matters,  but layered transparency could be introduced to SIGINT
oversight ecosystems.
• Access to information – effective oversight of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies requires maximal access to information. Full
access to information should be the default rather than the
exception, but the breadth of information access should match the
needs of the oversight mandate.
104
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The prerequisite of a proper oversight ecosystem – a detailed legislative
framework of government online surveillance activities – is not fully met in Israel.
Israeli online surveillance law is dated, thin, and shrouded in secrecy. 
Furthermore, applying these standards to the Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem
shows that it is incomplete. The lack of a dedicated and independent expert
oversight body is noticeable – judicial ex ante oversight of SIGINT activities in Israel
is limited, and lack adversity, and there is no external continuous oversight of the
routine operations of SIGINT measures. The State Comptroller – one of the only
oversight actors that can lead thorough, in depth inquiries in matters pertaining to
SIGINT –rarely uses its authority. Also noticeable is the lack of transparency, as the
rules governing the Tool are confidential, and any parliamentary oversight activities
thereof are secret by default. In the following we shall see how the Israeli SIGINT
oversight ecosystem reacted to the government’s resolution to authorize the ISA to
use the Tool for contact tracing purposes during the coronavirus outbreak.
I V .  C O V I D - 1 9 I N I S R E A L : C O U N T E R T E R R OR I S M M E A S U R E S T O W A R D O F F
A PLAGUE

A few weeks following the report of the first confirmed coronavirus carrier, who
had come aboard a Diamond Princess cruise ship to Israel,  the number of
coronavirus carriers increased exponentially. Israel responded in mid-March by
introducing a series of restrictive measures, including a general lockdown and
the use of location metadata for both epidemiological investigations and for
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monitoring compliance of self-quarantined individuals. The lockdown managed
to contain the spread of the virus by May.  However, with no exit strategy, a
second wave of the pandemic was soon to follow. In early July, Health Minister
Edelstein stated that Israel was entering a second wave of COVID-19, and in midSeptember, a second general lockdown was in place.
Israel entered the first wave of the pandemic with a caretaker government at a
political stalemate, and three consecutive parliamentary elections held within a year
did not resolve with the forming of a coalition. However, the coronavirus crisis
may have served as a catalyst – or an excuse – for an opposition party, Kahol Lavan,
to form a coalition with reigning Likud party. Negotiations between the parties
took place during April, and by May 2020, the new government was sworn in.
As early as March 9th, the Ministry of Health (MOH) requested that the ISA
complement a singular epidemiological investigation with its technological
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measures – the Tool. The ISA, pursuant to an internal approval by its legal advisor,
provided the MOH with a list of places where the patient stayed, as well as the details
of individuals who had come into close contact with the patient. On March 11th, the
ISA's legal advisor, in consultation with senior AG employees, agreed that for future
requests, a "new procedure [would] be established, subject to the approval of the
AG." However, the next day the MOH requested the ISA's assistance regarding a
second Coronavirus patient. The Director of the ISA approved the request. The
following day, the ISA Director approved expanding the scope of the service's
assistance to the MOH, subject to the approval of the AG. The position of the AG's
office at the time was that the proper legal path to regulate the ISA's coronavirus
surveillance was through a government resolution authorizing it.
At these early stages, the core tenets of the ISA's coronavirus surveillance
operation had already been established: the ISA would not provide MOH with direct
access to the Tool, and would provide MOH only with designated information (the
route of a coronavirus carrier and the persons with whom she has been in close
contact rather than raw metadata); the ISA would refrain from any corona-related
enforcement activities; and the ISA would not directly contact Israeli citizens.
The government initially attempted to pass Resolution 4897, authorizing the
ISA to assist in the national effort to reduce the spread of the novel coronavirus
pursuant to provisions of the ISA Law, which permits the ISA to undertake activities
beyond its statutory defined remit, subject to a government resolution approved by
the Intelligence Subcommittee.  The resolution authorized the ISA to "obtain,
collect and process Technological Data in order to assist the Ministry of Health in
an epidemiological investigation whose purpose is examining locations and routes
of a confirmed coronavirus carrier or of individuals who may have contracted
coronavirus as well as individuals with whom they have been in contact."
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However, Resolution 4897 did not pass. The Intelligence Subcommittee
meeting to approve the Resolution was scheduled a few hours before the 22nd
Knesset and its parliamentary committees were dissolved and the new Knesset was
sworn in. The Intelligence Subcommittee refused to merely rubber-stamp
Resolution 4897. While deliberating on Resolution 4897, however, the subcommittee
was dissolved without reaching a conclusion or an approval of the Resolution. In
lieu of parliamentary authorization, the government resolved to enact the
Emergency Coronavirus Regulations, which authorized ISA to conduct
Coronavirus surveillance for epidemiological investigations, and authorized the
police to obtain communications metadata of quarantined individuals (specifically,
their last cellular location) for monitoring purposes. Within days, the High Court
of Justice issued an interim order in the matter of Ben Meir, following an appeal by
several NGOs and activists, under which the powers of the ISA under the Emergency
Coronavirus Regulations was to be suspended within a few days unless a proper
parliamentary oversight committee was established. The court also suspended the
police's power to obtain communication data for quarantine enforcement under the
Emergency Coronavirus Regulations until further notice.
Following the reestablishment of some of the Knesset committees, including
the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and its Intelligence Subcommittee, the
latter began a series of meetings to discuss the proper legal framework to authorize
ISA Coronavirus surveillance as well as to draft a temporary amendment to the
Communication Data Law that would authorize the police to obtain cellular location
to monitor individual compliance with quarantine orders. Upon the expiration of
the Emergency Coronavirus Regulations the Intelligence Subcommittee approved

the chief executive officer of the ministry, or the head of the public health services. ISA's response
shall be made directly thereto and shall include only data directly required for the aforementioned
purpose. The resolution explicitly stated that the authorization thereunder shall not authorize
ISA to enforce quarantine order or monitor individuals who are under quarantine. The resolution
was meant to stay   &!
133

See supra note 119.

134

HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister (Mar. 19, 2020) (Isr.) (unpublished, interim order).
English translation available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/
opinions/Ben%20Meir%20v.%20Prime%20Minister.pdf [perma.cc/3LWZ-YF2W]. The police
emergency powers were later to be reinstated by the high court of justice in an updated interim
order. See HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister (Mar. 24, 2020) (Isr.) (unpublished, interim
order). English translation available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/viewpoints/coronavirusinterim-order-updateperma.cc/3AYK-T9QV]. 
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the amended Resolution 4950, effective for a 30-day period.  The draft
amendment to the Communications Data Law was eventually shelved by the
Minister for Internal Security.
The Ben Meir case was decided towards the end of effective period of Resolution
4950, and the High Court of Justice ordered that if the government sought to
authorize ISA to engage in coronavirus surveillance, such authorization should be
made through legislation. However, the court also allowed for further extensions of
Resolution 4950 by “a few weeks,” should the government pursue such a legislative
process. Indeed, the Subcommittee allowed for several more extensions .&
%2.+43).-
6()+%$%+)"%1!3)-'.-&413(%1$1!&32.&3(%!43(.1)9!3).-")++3(%
+!23 36. .& 6()#( -!11.6%$ 3(% 2#./% .&  #.1.-!5)142 +.#!3).- 31!#*)-' 3.
:/!13)#4+!1 !-$ 4-)04% #!2%2 6(%1%)- )$%-3)&)#!3).- .& 3(% /%12.-2 6(. #!,% )-3.
#+.2% #.-3!#3 6)3( 3(% .5)$  /!3)%-3 #!--.3 "% !#()%5%$ "8 1%'4+!1
%/)$%,).+.')#!+ )-5%23)'!3)5% ,%3(.$2; 1363 3(% 1%04%23 .& 3(%  $)1%#3.1 3(%
'.5%1-,%-31%&1!)-%$&1.,!//1.5)-'&413(%1%73%-2).-2.&%2.+43).-
6()#(
%7/)1%$3(%2%#.-$6%%*.&4-%
Within a fortnight after the expiration of the Resolution 4950, the second wave
of the pandemic ushered in a renewed sense of urgency. By June 25, the bill was
approved by the cabinet and subsequently passed in a preliminary reading in the
Knesset plenum. The bill was split in two: the main bill and temporary provisions.
The latter were effective for 21 days to allow for immediate reauthorization of ISA
coronavirus surveillance activities, while allowing for more thorough parliamentary
deliberations on the main bill, which was eventually enacted on July 20 as The Law
to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the
Novel Coronavirus and to Promote Use of Civilian Technology to Locate Individuals
who were in Close Contact with Patients (hereinafter: the Authorization Law).
The Authorization Law authorizes the ISA to process Technological Data 

135

Government Res. No. 4950, Authorizing ISA to assist in the national effort to reduce the
spread of the Novel Coronavirus, (Mar. 31, 2020) https://www.gov.il/he/departments/
policies/dec4950_2020 [hereinafter: Resolution 4950]. On Resolution 4950, see Amir Cahane,
Counterterrorism measures to counter epidemics: Covid-19 contact tracing in Israel, Blogdroiteuropéen
(Jul. 18, 2020), https://blogdroiteuropeen.com/2020/07/18/counterterrorism-measures-tocounter-epidemics-covid-19-contact-tracing-in-israel-by-amir-cahane/ [perma.cc/9RN3-ALQX].

136

Omer Kabir, Lawmakers Extend Spy Agency’s Covid-19 Patient Tracking Program by Three Weeks,
CTech (May 26, 2020), https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3827350,00.html
[perma.cc/JM54-A6FV].

137

Defined in Section 2 of the Authorization Law, supra note 7, as “Identification Data, Location
Data and Call Record Data, excluding the contents of a call as defined in the Wiretap Law [supra
note 17].” Identification Data are defined therein as “Name, ID number, telephone number and
date of birth”; Location Data are defined as “The location data of a cellular phone device”; and “Call
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regarding a patients and individuals with whom they had been in close contact
for the 14-day period preceding his diagnosis, and to provide MOH with the
Patient's Location Data during said period and with the Identification Data, the
time of contact with the Patient and the location of that contact, of individuals who
have been in close contact with the Patient.  These powers are effective only
pursuant to a government declaration of ISA authorization, which is subject to the
approval of the .1%)'-&&!)12!-$%#41)38.,,)33%%4#($%#+!1!3).-6)++"%
)- %&&%#3 -.3 +.-'%1 3(!-  $!82  -$%1 3(% 43(.1)9!3).- !6 3(% %!+3(
)-)23%1 ,423 /1.5)$% 3(% /4"+)# 6)3( #)5)+)!- #.-3!#3 31!#)-' 3%#(-.+.'8 !-$
/1.,.3%)3242%
The Authorization Law includes several oversight mechanisms. The first one,
mentioned above, is the government declaration of authorization. The legal
instruments preceding the Authorization Law were set to expire within weeks of
their promulgation and automatically !43(.1)9%$3(%3./!13!*%)-#.1.-!5)142
2415%)++!-#% (% 43(.1)9!3).- !6 (.6%5%1 !224,%$ 3(!3 $41)-' )32 %&&%#3)5%
/%1).$.&2)7,.-3(2#.-3)-4.422415%)++!-#%6.4+$-.3-%#%22!1)+8"%1%04)1%$
(%$%#+!1!3).-)2!31)''%1,%#(!-)2,6()#(1%04)1%23(%!//1.5!+.&3(%Foreign
Affairs and Security Committee
The provisions of the Authorization Law require both the ISA Director and
MOH representative to provide the .1%)'-&&!)12!-$%#41)38.,,)33%% and the
Attorney General's office with detailed weekly reports. Unlike the reports made
to the Subcommittee pursuant to the ISA Law,  these reports are not deemed

Record Data” are defined as “Incoming call phone number, Outgoing call phone number and the
time of the call.” Compare the definition of Technological Data to the inclusive definition of both
Technological Data and of ‘Data’ in Section 11 of the ISA Law, supra note 10, as well as to the
narrower language defining Metadata in the Communications Data Law, supra note 20.
138

Defined in Section 2 of the Authorization Law, supra note 7, as “a patient with a positive
laboratory result to the novel coronavirus.” Compare with the ISA Law, supra note 10, and see Ben
Meir interim order, supra note 134, at ¶ 4(a).
139

§ 5(a), Authorization Law, supra note 7.

140

§ 3-3a, Authorization Law, supra note 7.

141

§ 3(d), Authorization Law, supra note 7.

142

§ 12a, Authorization Law, supra note 7. Under section 12a(b), such civilian contact tracing
technologies are to be installed only voluntarily, subject to the user's consent.

143

Under section 3a of the Authorization Law, the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee may
approve, shorten, or not approve the declaration's effective period. When the Committee decides
not to approve a declaration, it expires within 24 hours.
144
145

§ 19, Authorization Law, supra note 7.

 § 19, ISA Law, supra note 10.
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classified by default. MOH procedures under the Authorization Law are to be made
public, while ISA procedures thereunder are classified.
A redress mechanism is also placed in the Authorization Law, which allows
individuals who were identified by the ISA as persons who have been in close
contact with a patient to appeal to the MOH. The MOH may request in such cases
that the ISA reexamine the data which indicated that the appellant was in close
contact with a coronavirus carrier, and must inform the appellant within 24 hours
of its decision.  More than 63% of the appeals submitted under this procedure
were granted, indicating the Tool's low efficacy in identifying coronavirus
carriers.
The Authorization Law also establishes a ministerial committee to reexamine
the necessity of further use of ISA measures pursuant to its provisions. The
ministerial committee, which includes the Prime Minister, the alternate Prime
Minister,  and the Justice, Health, and Intelligence Ministers, as well as other
ministers as the government may decide, considers the contribution of ISA
activities to containing the spread of the pandemic and the existence of alternatives
thereto, in light of the right to privacy. The ministerial committee is to be provided
with the opinion of the PPA.
 ( #" '"%" 

146
147

 (  #" '"%" 

148

§ 8, Authorization Law, supra note 7.

149

Privacy Protection Authority, PPA Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA
to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary
Provisions) 8 (2020) [hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 5], available in Hebrew only at
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus_5/he/5OPINION.pdf; The
State Comptroller Interim reports states that the number of individuals who were notified that
they were in close contact with patients is lower than the number of contacts provided by the ISA
to the MOH, and therefore the error rate of the ISA is even higher. See State Comptroller's
Office, supra note 81, at p. 110. One of the possible reasons for the ISA's inaccuracy is its use of
Call Record Data (as defined in the ISA under the Authorization Law), as there were complaints
of individuals who were identified as having contacts with coronavirus carriers with whom they
merely talked on the phone. Dikla Ahron Shafran, Did you talk on the phone or SMSed with a confirmed
patient? you might be sent to quarantine KAN (November 2020) available at https://perma.cc/6F8BCN4E.
150

See § 13a, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5761-1992, SH 1780 158 (Isr.). English
translation available at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm [https://
perma.cc/C7E5-BFHK].

151

§ 12, Authorization Law, supra note 7. So far, the PPA produced seven such opinions: PPA
Opinion No. 1, supra note 14; PPA Opinion No. 5, supra note 149; Privacy Protection Authority,
PPA Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National
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However, the ministerial committee inherently cannot be independent. It is
part of the executive and as such perhaps plays the part of an internal oversight
mechanism, but it may lack sufficient independence from changing political
pressures to be an effective oversight measure. Furthermore, although the statutory
reports allow the PPA to voice its opposing opinion against ISA coronavirus
surveillance, their reports did not seem to have any influence on the
recommendations of the ministerial committee or the continuous approvals by the
Knesset's .1%)'-&&!)12!-$%#41)38.,,)33%%.&'.5%1-,%-3$%#+!1!3).-24-$%1
the Authorization Law.
V. THE OVERSIGHT ECOSYSTEM RESPONSE TO COVID-19

A. Internal and Executive Oversight
During the first wave of the pandemic, internal and AG oversight of ISA
activities remained confidential. The AG office was central in the process of drafting
the various legal instruments authorizing ISA activities – appearing before the
Intelligence Subcommittee and during the first days of the pandemic – involved in
authorizing the first two contact tracing operations. It appears that while the AG
office opted for government authorization under section 7(b)(6) of the ISA Law,
which entails partial parliamentary oversight by way of the Intelligence
Subcommittee's approval, it did allow the exceptional authorizations by the ISA
Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020)
[hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 2], available in Hebrew only at https://www.gov.il/Blob
Folder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus_2/he/privacy-shabak-coronavirus-2.pdf;
Privacy
Protection Authority, PPA Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA
to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus
(Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020) [hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 3], available in Hebrew only at
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus_3/he/privacy-shabakcoronavirus-3.pdf; Privacy Protection Authority, PPA Opinion in Accordance with the
Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the
Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020) [hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 4],
available in Hebrew only at https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-corona
virus_4/he/privacy-shabak-coronavirus_4.pdf Privacy Protection Authority, PPA Opinion
in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to
Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020)
[hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 6], available in Hebrew only at https://www.gov.il
/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus-6/he/opinion6.pdf; Privacy Protection
Authority, PPA Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in
the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary
Provisions) 8 (2020) [hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 7], available in Hebrew only at
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus-7/he/777777777777777.pdf
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Director for contact tracing analysis of the first two COVID-19 patients without any
such scrutiny. It is unknown whether internal AG discussion raised concerns of the
potential mission of the ISA's Tool. Prima facie, however, the AG office allowed it to
occur, perhaps mitigating it by preferring parliamentary involvement in the
rulemaking process.
B. Judicial Oversight
As mentioned above, there is no ex ante judicial oversight of ISA SIGINT
measures. Accordingly, ISA COVID-19 surveillance reached the High Court of
Justice only through a petition from civil society bodies that at first challenged the
constitutionality of the Coronavirus Emergency Regulations, and later challenged
the legal framework set under the 4897 Resolution.
The interim order in Ben Meir reflected a position favoring parliamentary
oversight: the court conditioned continued ISA authorization under the
Coronavirus Emergency Regulations on relevant oversight parliamentary
committees being formed. Two months into the COVID-19 outbreak, the Ben Meir
ruling continued emphasizing parliamentary supremacy. It focused on the Israeli
non-delegation doctrine, under which the ISA may be authorized to engage in
coronavirus location tracking only through primary legislation, rather than by a
government resolution (albeit subject to the approval of a parliamentary
subcommittee) or emergency regulations (that are not enacted by the Knesset).
The Ben Meir ruling did pay tribute to privacy considerations, albeit as dicta, while
its holding focused on the proper interpretation of the term “National Security”
within the context of the “mission creep” clause of the ISA Law.
Subsequent to the enactment of the Authorization Law, it was challenged in the
High Court of Justice. Currently the case is pending, yet it seems that the court
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Ben Meir interim order, supra note 134, at ¶ 4(a).

153

Elena Chachko, “The Israeli Supreme Court Checks COVID-19 Electronic Surveillance” LAWFARE.
(5.5.2020). [https://perma.cc/E7N7-A5F3].

154

§ 7(b)(6), ISA Law, supra note 10.

155

See § 38-39, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5761-1992, SH 1780 158 (Isr.). English
translation available at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm [https://
perma.cc/C7E5-BFHK].
156

See Ben Meir ruling, supra at 68, at ¶¶ 35–42.

HCJ 6732/20 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset (2020) (Isr.) The preceding
challenges to the Authorization Law were dismissed on procedural grounds. For the Israeli
petitions, see HCJ 5746/20 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset (2020) (Isr.) For an
overview of the petition see Adalah, ACRI, Adalah, PHRI & Privacy Israel petition Israeli
157
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is not comfortable with the ongoing use of the ISA measures for coronavirus,
following an interim order demanding to know why should the ISA coronavirus
surveillance is restricted to cases where patients refuse to cooperate with
epidemiological investigations.  The court further demanded the respondent
explain why the MOH is not upholding its statutory duties to promote alternative
civilian technologies.
C. Parliamentary Oversight
Two days following the Prime Minister's public statement regarding the
intended use of digital counterterrorism measures to identify COVID-19 carriers,
the Intelligence Subcommittee adjourned to discuss the government request to
approve Resolution 4950. However, that meeting was terminated before reaching a
resolution, because the Knesset dissolved and a new parliament was sworn in.
The first round of hearings by the newly-formed Intelligence Subcommittee
was devoted to drafting the amended Resolution 4987. At its early stages, the
Subcommittee expressed a tepid position: they would approve the amended
Resolution 4987 for a limited 30-day period, but further approval would be
conditioned upon thorough and detailed evidence prepared by an expert
government body explaining that no alternatives were available.  This stance
gradually eroded as the outbreak progressed and the Knesset coalition was formed.
By the end of the first effective period of Resolution 4987, the Subcommittee’s
chairperson, MK Ashkenazi, was to become the Foreign Minister in the forming
coalition. MK Ashkenazi did not insist on any evidence regarding available

Supreme Court: Repeal law authorizing Shin Bet to track citizens with COVID-19,
https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/10085 [https://perma.cc/9HFS-JC2R]. For a critique of
the procedural dismissal of these petitions and others See Adam Shinar, Why decide if you can avoid?
DYOMA (Sept. 6, 2020) [Hebrew] [https://www.dyoma.co.il/%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A7-%D7%95%
D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A4%D7%98/463-%D7%9C%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7
%9B%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A2-%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%A9%D7%A8-%D7%9C%D
7%94%D7%AA%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%A7 [https://perma.cc/MV7J-BMH4].
158

HCJ 6732/20 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset (November 11, 2020) (Isr.)
(Unpublished, Interim Order) See also Yonah Jeremy Bob, High Court puts the heat on Shin Bet
coronavirus surveillance, The Jerusalem Post (Nov. 11, 2020). English available at
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/high-court-puts-the-heat-on-shin-bet-coronavirussurveillance-649389 [https://perma.cc/UME3-3EZF].
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§ 12, Authorization Law, supra note 7.

160

Supra note 34.

161

Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee Minutes, Knesset Security and Foreign
Affairs Committee, protocol no. 3, March 30, 2020, at 40.
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alternative measures to the ISA coronavirus surveillance  and approved the
extension of the effective period for a week in order to allow the government to
pursue a legislative path to ISA authorization, per Ben Meir. As MK Ashkenazi left
the Subcommittee for greener pastures, the incoming chairperson, MK Hauser, also
from a coalition party, exhibited an approach more tolerant of the government's
position, favoring ISA surveillance and less insistent on the development and
promotion of civilian alternatives.
Thematically, the Subcommittee's discussions tended to focus on the necessity
of the Tool for containing the spread of the pandemic, rather than assessing its
proportionality. Even in the early stages of discussion, members of the committee
had at times drifted into general questions of Israel's COVID-19 strategy. During
April 2020, the Subcommittee also engaged in several discussions pertaining to the
drafting of an amendment to the Communications Data Law, authorizing the police
to obtain location data for quarantine monitoring purposes, even though oversight
of the police forces is not within the Subcommittee's purview.  At some point
during the second wave of the pandemic, the discussions were steered towards MK
Hauser's initiative to reduce the length of the quarantine period from 14 to 10 days.
Even if this step could have increased the Israeli public’s overall compliance with
quarantine orders, its relevance to the extension of the declaration period under the
Authorization Law is indirect at best.
The initial expertise gap of the Intelligence Subcommittee members, as
reported by %1',!- !-$ (5!13934#(,  was bridged in a series of confidential
Subcommittee hearings with ISA members, at least one of which was attended by
an academic expert. Nevertheless, some statements made in the early meetings,
and the change made in the Subcommittee’s membership pursuant to the
formation of the government, indicate that its members were not fully informed at
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Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee Minutes, Knesset Security and Foreign
Affairs Committee, protocol no. 8, April 30, 2020, at 13–14.
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Ben Meir ruling at ¶ 34.

 # "   #  "  ! "  "  "   $ #!
#"! "  %  empowered to obtain Location Data directly from licensed
telecommunication providers, with no involvement of the ISA.
164

165

Supra note 71.

166

Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee Minutes, Knesset Security and Foreign
Affairs Committee, protocol no. 1, March 26, 2020, at 36.
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all times.  Changing statistical indices  could have also contributed to
information gaps and confusion of policymakers.
The Subcommittee, however, did open to the public most hearings pertaining
to ISA coronavirus surveillance from its first discussions on the matter, contrary to
the default rule classifying the Intelligence Subcommittee's hearings. Furthermore,
the Subcommittee invited civil society bodies and privacy experts to participate in
its meetings (although during the October-November meetings on the extension of
the declaration period they were hardly encouraged to voice their opinions.) 
Nevertheless, despite its rare public openness, and even rarer moment of
independence,  the Subcommittee appeared to be influenced by the political shifts
in the background, as well as by its chairperson's agenda. The Subcommittee further
lacked initiative. For example, the initiative to narrow the scope of ISA's surveillance
3.:/!13)#4+!1!-$4-)04%#!2%2"  came from the ISA, rather from the parliamentary
overseers.
D. The Privacy Protection Authority
Initially, the PPA was not involved in the authorization of the first two instances
of ISA coronavirus surveillance. According to the schedule of the acting head of the
PPA, only after Prime Minister Netanyahu’s televised statement regarding the
intention to employ digital counterterrorism means to contain the pandemic did
the management of the PPA discuss the matter.  Although its schedule indicates
that the PPA was preoccupied with ISA coronavirus surveillance matters as early as
mid-March, the PPA did not make any public statement on the matter, nor did PPA
167

Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee Minutes, Knesset Security and Foreign
Affairs Committee, protocol no. 3, March 30, 2020, at 20.
168

See for example the letter by Privacy Israel to the Foreign Affairs and Security committee,
pointing out that the computation methodology of certain indicators in the MOH reports was
changed, thereby presenting results favorable to the continued use of ISA surveillance. Privacy
Israel, Examining the ISA Tool's effectiveness: quantitative indicators (Letter from Privacy Israel to the
Foreign Affairs and Security committee, (Jan 1, 2020) [Hebrew] (on file with the UNH Law
Review).
169

Omer Kabir, “Experts' boycott Knesset hearings on ISA surveillance: we are silenced” Calcalist
(Nov. 11, 2020) [Hebrew] available at https://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L3875031,00.html [https://perma.cc/7CCV-JB3R].
170

Supra at note 161.

171

Supra at note 136.

172

Schedule of the acting PPA Head, Dr.Shlomit Wagman, Jan.–June 2020. [Hebrew] available
at https://www.odata.org.il/dataset/4bfcdd69-b76f-4bb8-9f45-afc6b9694565 [https://perma.cc/9C
EN-BJBU].

481

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

19:2 (2021)

representatives attend the early hearings of the Intelligence Subcommittee.
Towards the end of April, the PPA was invited to join the Subcommittee only after
the Justice Minister received a letter from a group of privacy experts /1.3%23)-'3(%
2!"2%-#%&1.,3(%(%!1)-'2 
Gradually, the PPA's voice was heard. Following the suggestion of the Defense
Minister to source a private company to develop an Israeli “health scoring”
system,  the PPA published a critical survey of credit scoring systems.  In late
May, the PPA published a survey of COVID-19 digital monitoring systems, which
concluded that the ISA measures were the most privacy-infringing measures
available. 
As of mid-July, under the Authorization Law, the PPA provided the Ministerial
Committee with its opinion regarding the ISA authorization. In its seven opinions
(as of December 2020),  the PPA consistently raised an opposing voice to the
continuing use of the ISA's measures for Coronavirus location tracking, doubting
its efficacy,  calling for the promotion and development of alternative civilian
measures. In its opinions under the Authorization Law, the PPA also expressed its
opposition to any involuntary surveillance measure. The PPA further noted no
correlation had been found between the use of technological measures (voluntary
or involuntary) in other jurisdictions and the spread of the pandemic. 
Nevertheless, although the PPA is granted a statutory role, it appears to be that
of a mere privacy advocate. The PPA lacks any effective teeth – it cannot veto the
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Omer Kabir, “Privacy Experts to Government: there are those who want that the right to privacy will
not interfere with the corona crisis” Calcalist (Apr. 22, 2020) [Hebrew] available at
https://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3809882,00.html [https://perma.cc/CA82-8
FH8].
174

Yasmin Yablonko, “Bennett plans using NSO to rate individual virus exposure” Globes (March 30,
2020) [https://perma.cc/YKH3-KBBS].
175

Privacy Protection Authority, “Social scoring in light of the right to privacy: a review regarding social
scoring systems” (Apr. 23, 2020) [Hebrew] available at https://www.gov.il/he/departments/
publications/reports/social_ranking.
176

Privacy Protection Authority, “Digital monitoring in the corona age in light of the right to
privacy: technologies’’ review, a global comparative look and ranking of possible models”
[Hebrew]
(May
26,
2020)
available
at
https://www.gov.il/he/departments/
publications/reports/digital_tracking_riview.
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Supra note 151.
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See PPA Opinion No. 4 at 1; PPA Opinion No. 5 at 2; PPA Opinion No. 7 (referring to State
Comptrollers Interim Report, supra note 81).
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PPA Opinion No. 5 at 1, discussing § 12a(b), Authorization Law, supra note 7.

180

PPA Opinion No. 7 at 4.
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authorization of ISA surveillance like the Foreign Affairs and Security Committees.
Any research prepared for the PPA opinions appears to rely on publicly available
sources, and accordingly it may be the case that the PPA lacks any actual oversight
powers that provide it with better access to information than civil society bodies.
However, the PPA opinions, like the State Comptroller’s interim reports, may
influence other oversight actors as they serve to reinforce legal or policy arguments
in court or in parliamentary deliberations.
E. The State Controller
As the first wave of the pandemic ended, the State Comptroller Matanyahu
Englman stated in parliament that his office would review ISA coronavirus location
tracking as part of its annual review.  (% 1%/.13 /4"+)2(%$ )- +!3% #3."%1
"%&)33)-'3(%!//1.!#(.&1-'+,!- #!1%&4++8!5.)$%$!-8$)1%#3!##42!3).-2 
8%3 3(% )-&.1,!3).- )3 /1.5)$%$ 6!2 24&&)#)%-3 3. 24''%23 3(!3  #.1.-!5)142
2415%)++!-#%6!2)-%&&)#)%-3 
During July and until mid-August 2020, the State Comptroller's Office
investigated the ISA's coronavirus surveillance activities. In addition to performing
an audit on the ISA, the Comptroller's Office also engaged with the ministry of
Intelligence and the PPA.
The part of the report that was made public  analysed the effectiveness of the
Tool by offering two different indices – SNR (signal to noise ratio) and BDA (battle
damage assessment). According to the report, the overall BDA, which is the ratio
between the number of confirmed patients examined by the ISA and the number of
confirmed patients discovered by the ISA, was 28.5% –for nearly every three patients
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referred to the ISA, the Tool detected one other coronavirus carrier.  The report
further stated that the SNR, which is the ratio between the number of patients
detected by the ISA and the overall number of contacts detected as associated with
them, was 3.5% – out of more than 25 individuals that the ISA identified to have been
in close contact with a coronavirus carrier, only one was eventually found to be a
confirmed carrier of the virus. The report compared the SNR of the ISA measures to
the SNR of the still ongoing traditional epidemiological investigations, which was
much higher (nearly 24%). Despite this data, the report did not draw any direct
conclusion as to the efficacy of the Tool.
Another revelation made by the report is that ISA location tracking activity for
the first two coronavirus patients referred to by the MOH was undertaken without
any legal basis, based on the authorization of the ISA legal advisor and the ISA
Director.  The report also made note of several incidents in which data was not
properly handled. The matter of alternative civilian measures was also discussed,
and the the report called on the MOH and the Ministry of Intelligence to promote
such measures. The report recommended that the Ministerial Committee remap
the process and form a recommendation if, under current circumstances,
considering the efficacy of ISA activities and potential privacy harms, there was
sufficient reason to continue relying on ISA coronavirus surveillance or if other
alternatives based on thorough epidemiological investigations might be
preferable. 
F. Civil Society
As an oversight actor, civil society was engaged in several fronts during the
coronavirus epidemic. First, it researched and informed public debate on ISA
coronavirus surveillance and its civilian alternatives;  second, civil society bodies
and activists were the initiators of the Ben Meir case, and the subsequent
proceedings against the Authorization Law; and, finally, civil society bodies,
activists and privacy experts took an active role in the Intelligence Subcommittee's
hearings (at first), providing parliamentarians with opinions and background
information.
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The protest letter, as mentioned above, rendered the PPA more involved in the
ISA coronavirus public discourse, and contributed to its inclusion in the
parliamentary subcommittee's discussions.  A bill drafted by civil society bodies
and privacy experts proposed a framework promoting alternative measures to ISA
surveillance.  Albeit not fully acknowledged by the Intelligence Subcommittee, the
bill appears to have influenced the drafting of the Authorization Law. Section 12a,
added pursuant to the civil society suggested bill, provides that the Health Minister
must provide the public with civilian contact tracing technology, and promote its
use.
However, during late November, civil society bodies and experts regularly
invited to the Intelligence Subcommittee committee hearings regarding ISA
coronavirus surveillance notified the Chairperson that they would be boycotting the
hearings. Their letter claimed that the Subcommittee had been avoiding a serious
discussion about ISA coronavirus surveillance, and would rather drift into matters
outside its purview, such as shortening the mandatory quarantine period, while also
neglecting the discussion of the failure of Israel's contact tracing app, Hamagen
2.0.   The letter also claimed that during the previous two months, civil society
experts had been no more than extras, hardly heard in the Subcommittee hearings
held via Zoom. 
Overall, civil society organizations, activists and privacy experts were crucial to
the oversight ecosystem during the coronavirus pandemic, as they were an
independent voice promoting privacy considerations and offering policy
alternatives. Their activities served as a catalyst and prompted other oversight
bodies – such as the PPA and the courts - to act.
G. Revisiting Eskens et al.
The framework offered by Eskens et al. and expanded on in part 3 of this paper
can be used to examine the performance of the Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem
during the coronavirus crisis, as was described above.

192

See supra note 173.

193

Ronit Sella, “Israel: a bill proposes alternatives to ISA tracing of Covid-19 patients” LAW.CO.IL (July
13, 2020) available at https://www.law.co.il/en/news/2020/07/13/civilian-alternatives-to-isatracing-of-covid-19-patients/[https://perma.cc/A7F7-FYJH].

194

On the failure of Hamagen 2.0, see Josh Mitnick, “How Israel's COVID contact tracing app
rollout went wildly astray” CIO (July 11, 2020) available at https://www.cio.com/
article/3591570/how-israels-hamagen-contact-tracing-app-rollout-went-wildly-astray.html
[https://perma.cc/PJ5M-7FFE].
195

Kabir, supra note 169.

485

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

19:2 (2021)

• Detailed Legislative Framework – the absence of a detailed legislative
framework regulating Israel's SIGINT practices allowed for extended
deliberations by the parliamentary oversight body – the Intelligence
Subcommittee – which took an active part in designing the legal
frameworks ruling the ISA coronavirus location tracking. Had there been a
more detailed legislative framework, coronavirus surveillance would have
been addressed as a routine (albeit under unique circumstances) oversight
issue. 
• Complete oversight – while the SIGINT oversight ecosystem in Israel
remained institutionally incomplete during the coronavirus pandemic,
lacking a designated independent SIGINT, some improvements are
noticeable in the narrow context of ISA coronavirus surveillance. An appeal
mechanism was introduced, and the temporal completeness of the Israeli
oversight ecosystem has improved as well – as the continuity of the
parliamentary and executive oversight of ISA coronavirus surveillance was
enhanced under the Authorization Law, which requires both MOH and ISA
to provide them with weekly reports.
• Independence – as mentioned above, Israel's oversight ecosystem lacks an
independent actor. The parliamentary Subcommittee did exhibit a
modicum of independence at the early stages of its response to the
government's intention to utilize the ISA for coronavirus surveillance, yet
this independence fluctuated and eroded with the political backdrop.
Additionally, as much as the High Court is indeed independent, it is neither
a dedicated or continuous oversight body, and its tendency to delay the post
Ben Meir appeals against the Authorization Law  may be attributed to
external political pressures.
• Ex ante oversight. Although ex ante oversight is less relevant to location
tracking, the declaration mechanism in the Authorization law could be
deemed as providing the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee
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with some measure of ex ante authorization powers.
• Power to declare a measure unlawful and provide redress. The High Court of
Justice did use its powers to order the police and the ISA not to use their
powers under the Emergency Coronavirus Regulations. The appeal
mechanisms under the Authorization Law may not provide full redress to
individuals quarantined based on the ISA's Tool, but it offers them a way to
cancel the quarantine order.
• While the Adversarial principle is more relevant in the ex ante context, its
instances in ex post oversight and policymaking regarding ISA COVID-19
surveillance were evident. However, the rare openness of the Intelligence
Subcommittee and its initial inclusion of civil society bodies allowed the
latter to express an adversarial position, thereby mitigating potential
capture of the subcommittee members. The Ben Meir case was handled
with both parties present in the court room, rather than in ex parte
proceeding (which are more common in ex ante cases).
• The increased Transparency was most discernible in the Israeli SIGINT
oversight ecosystem during the coronavirus epidemic. The oral arguments
in Ben Meir were streamed online in real time, as were most of the
Intelligence Subcommittee's hearings. Unlike the 1950s two-line report by
the Israeli’s Knesset ad hoc Parliamentary Subcommittee for the Matter of
Secret Wiretapping Devices and Secret Party Services, the Intelligence
Subcommittee hearings generated a plethora of reports and documents
offering opinions and data to an extent previously unavailable. However,
the quality of some of the data, as a measure of the Access to information
standard set by Eskens et. al, was at times less than optimal. Reports made
by various stakeholders included conflicting information, which at times
caused policymakers to compare apples with oranges. Changes in data
computations were introduced in a manner meant to present the utility
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and efficacy of the ISA tool in a better light.
An overall assessment of the Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem during the
coronavirus epidemic shows increased levels of transparency and procedural
adversity. However, the low level of independence exhibited by the main oversight
actors may indicate that the increased levels of transparency and procedural
adversity were supported by ephemeral conditions unique to the biological nature
of the surveillance target, and, as the next part suggests, that these slight
improvements in the oversight ecosystem might not apply to routine SIGINT
practices. Furthermore, given that the Israeli IC kept on using SIGINT measures for
national security purposes during the coronavirus outbreak, it would be safe to
assume that these changes were compartmentalized to apply only to coronavirus
surveillance matters.
VI. COVID-19 AS A TEST CASE?

A side effect of the coronavirus was piercing the veil of secrecy surrounding
Israel's SIGINT oversight ecosystem. However, some of the circumstances that
allowed this rare glimpse may not apply to the routine workings of the SIGINT
oversight ecosystem.
First, the bio-political nature of the ISA’s coronavirus location tracking differs
greatly from the routine ISA surveillance for counterterrorism and
counterintelligence purposes. As coronavirus location tracking is not terror-related,
nor is it political, there is hardly any reason for secrecy. There is no adversary whose
awareness of being under surveillance might bring about operational risks.
Second, since no one is immune to COVID-19, there is a certain likelihood that
overseers and policymakers will also contract the virus and be subjected to
surveillance. This possibility may contribute to enhanced sensitivity regarding
privacy matters, whereas it is highly unlikely that overseers or policymakers shall
become targets of counterterrorism surveillance. Accordingly, the willingness to
sacrifice rights and liberty for national security purposes is greater when the “other”
is expected to pay the toll.
Third, targeted coronavirus surveillance, or even untargeted coronavirus
surveillance might not be significantly improved by judicial authorization. Whereas
surveillance for law enforcement purposes – and, at times, for national security
purposes – requires a certain estimate of human culpability, the standards applying
to coronavirus are not legal but medical. It has become, therefore, the subject matter
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of experts.  Therefore, the question of ex ante review of online surveillance is
rendered moot within the context of coronavirus surveillance, while it is one of the
most salient lacunae in the Israeli SIGINT oversight system.
Additionally, the SIGINT oversight ecosystem during the COVID-19 pandemic
was mainly concerned with policy-level oversight. The focus of the Subcommittee
and to some extent the High Court in Ben Meir were the necessity of , and the
safeguards and controls required for, ISA coronavirus surveillance. Although some
policy determinations, especially those attempting to assess the efficacy of ISA
surveillance, attempted to be data driven, the day-to-day working of ISA
surveillance was rarely reviewed.
Even before the coronavirus, Cohen claimed that in Israel the executive branch
overtook the Knesset, and that parliamentary oversight in Israel was ineffective.
The COVID-19 outbreak significantly marginalized parliaments worldwide vis-a-vis
the executive branch. However, due to the political circumstances in Israel upon
the outbreak, the Intelligence Subcommittee was in a position of independence
before a coalition formed. Once the coalition formed, the dominance of the
executive was reestablished and, accordingly, the Subcommittee repeatedly
approved extending the ISA's authorizations. While the source of these
circumstances is not COVID-19, it is highly unlikely to resurface in a future SIGINTrelated crisis.
Although the coronavirus presented a set of unique circumstances for the
Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem, some lessons can still be carried forward. The
coronavirus affair demonstrated the importance of transparency. Transparency,
which fosters democratic accountability of intelligence services in general, also
allows oversight to flourish. Information is, after all, the life blood of oversight.
Transparent information flow (subject, of course, to reasonable confidentiality) to
the public is the precondition to the work of civil society bodies, whose contribution
to the oversight ecosystem throughout the covid-19 epidemic was of immeasurable
importance. However, transparency is not the statutory default but the exception,
and during ordinary, COVID-free times the Intelligence Subcommittee, the ISA and
the AG retain strict confidentiality as to SIGINT and its oversight.
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Despite the important role played by civil society and academia in creating
feedback loops inside the oversight ecosystem (through litigation or the call for
strengthening the position of the PPA, which in their turn contributed to an
independent discourse), a dedicated expert SIGINT oversight body cannot be
replaced thereby. I have suggested elsewhere that an independent SIGINT oversight
agency, modeled after the British Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPCO), will
be able to fill in the gaps in the Israeli oversight ecosystem.  The suggested
independent Israeli SIGINT commission, which would (similar to IPCO) have
quasi-judicial powers to authorize online surveillance warrants, could not be
downplayed in the coronavirus scenario to the position of the PPA as a toothless
privacy advocate, as it would have the authority to veto coronavirus surveillance.
While the Authorization Law did introduce some enhanced oversight
mechanisms, their scope is limited to the contact tracing practices of the ISA. It is
unlikely that the Authorization Law will transform into a wider legal reform of the
Israeli SIGINT laws and oversight ecosystem, neither pursuant to the pending
decision in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset,  nor following a
parliamentary initiative. However, the lessons derived from the COVID-19 epidemic
illustrate the importance of transparency, expertise and independence for the
SIGINT oversight ecosystem in ordinary times, as well as the significance of the
inclusion of well-informed civil society organizations in the deliberative process.
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